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Abstract
Cet article e´tudie les divisions biaise´es du travail au sein des me´nages
Egyptiens. La re´partition classique entre travail marchand et loisir peut ex-
pliquer, en grande partie, l’utilisation du temps des hommes. Ne´anmoins,
cette re´partition ne´glige la totalite´ du temps que les femmes passent au tra-
vail domestique. A noter que l’occupation pre´dominante des femmes dans les
pays en de´veloppement en ge´ne´ral et en Egypte en particulier demeure invisi-
ble; les donne´es statistiques sur le travail domestiques e´tant rares. Les donne´es
utilise´es dans la pre´sente e´tude proviennent des Enqueˆtes- emploi Egyptienne
de 1998 et 2006. Une premie`re partie de cette e´tude consiste a` explorer ces
donne´es a` partir de deux approches diffe´rentes: en coupe et longitudinale. Et,
en deuxie`me partie, nous estimons- a` partir de l’e´chantillon panel- un mode`le
de matching qui nous permet d’e´valuer l’impact du mariage sur les offres de
travail domestiques et marchandes des femmes Egyptiennes.
Abstract
The present research explores for the first time to our best knowledge the
extremely biased division of labor within Egyptian households. Time activities
in respect of paid and unpaid work are an important aspect of this study. The
classical dichotomy of “work in the market” versus “leisure” may serve as a
good approximation of the role the male plays in the production activity of
the household but does gross injustice to the female since it overlooks the whole
time she spends, outside the market, on domestic activities. And, studying
the females’ invisible unpaid work is crucial since it remains the female’s main
occupation. Time use profiles are constructed using the Egyptian time use
data available, only for females, in the Egyptian Labor Market and Panel
Surveys of 1998 and 2006. The empirical exercise consists in, on the one hand-
analyzing the main features of Egyptian females’ time allocation relying on
both cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis. On the other hand, we estimate
a Propensity Score Matching model in order to evaluate the effect of marriage
on females market and domestic labor supplies.
JEL classification: D13, J16, J22.
Mots cle´s: Allocation du temps, Travail domestique, Approche Longitudinale, Match-
ing, Egypte.
Keywords: Time Allocation, Domestic Production, Descriptive Analysis, Propensity
Score Matching, Egypt.
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1 Introduction
In the present study, we explore time allocations of Egyptian females. We prop-
erly distinguish between single and married females.
The need to adopt the household as a unit of analysis is particulary significant if the
focus of attention is females’ economic behavior as they tend to invest more time in
activities that remain outside the cash economy. Economists have made a large ef-
fort to explain the market behavior of married women (i.e., patterns of participation,
number of hours worked, determinants of wives earnings...). However, very little has
been done to analyze the allocation of time within the home sector (Gronau, 1976).
The classical dichotomy of “work in the market” versus “leisure” may serve as a good
approximation of the role the male plays in the production activity of the household
but does gross injustice, especially in developing countries, to the female. As Gronau
said thirty years ago, calling the whole time spent by the female outside the market
sector “leisure” is to overlook the production activities she engages in work at home.
These activities are better termed “domestic production”.
According to the UN convention “all persons of either sex who furnish the supply
of labor for the production of economic goods and services” should have been in-
cluded in labor force statistics during the last two decades (ILO, 1976:32, quoted
in Beneria 1981: 21). In addition to that, economic activities are, theoretically,
all those activities that satisfy human needs through the production of goods and
services, regardless of wether they are channeled through the cash market or other
forms of exchange. Then, there is no good reason why cooking and food processing
should be considered less productive than growing food, especially that cooking for
one’s employer is an economic activity but cooking for one’s own household is not
(Waring, 1988). Adoption of such a definition would give visibility to females and
children in national figures since they make important economic contributions to
the domestic unit (and to the national economy) through these activities. Moreover,
correct information on women’s work is “crucial for diagnosing the causes of poverty
and inequality - and for policy guiding policymakers in their attempts to improve
living standards” (Schaffner, 2000a).
In addition to this, Neoclassical theory (Becker, 1965) has convincingly argued that
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the division between females’ participation in nonmarket activities and males’ in
market activities is based on efficiency and the maximization of utility. However,
the latter does not seem to be justified since females contribution to their household
often exceeds that of their male partner and their share of benefits is less (Folbre,
1984). Moreover, while many females contribute more hours of work to support their
households than their husbands do, they are often heard to declare “I do not work”
or “I am only a housewife”, because their labor is not remunerated. And this has
significant implications for their status and position not only in their households but
also in society (Hoodfar, 1997).
Like in Gronau’s (1976), the wife’s time is an iceberg: We have plenty of informa-
tion about the visible tip, the time spent in the market, but almost none about the
submerged part spent at home. In other words, the problem of females’ activities is
that they are often not ‘counted’ in statistics, not ‘accounted for’ in representations
of the economy and not ‘taken into account’ when policies are created (Elson, 2000).
Suitable statistical means to recognize and make visible the full extent of the work
of women and all their contributions to the national economy including their contri-
bution in the unremunerated and domestic sectors (United Nations, Fourth World
Conference on Women, 1995-68.b).
Let’s start by defining the “Domestic Production”. The latter represent all unpaid
work done to maintain family members and/or a home. This topic has been widely
recognized, in developed countries, as an important area of research study since the
nineties. During the last decade, various studies and publications were the result
of a strong turn of attention towards the analysis of the division of labor between
members of the same household. Fewer studies on this topic have been conducted
in developing countries as well as in the Arab world. In addition to this, most of
the studies exploring the females participation in Egypt during the last decade con-
cluded that educated females are tending to less participate in the labor market. The
reasons of such a fact are usually analyzed relying on the labor market conditions
and especially the privatization reforms that took place in the 1990’s. However, the
present research makes some evidences about new explanations of females’ large non
participation rates. The perfectly biased intrahousehold allocation of time prevents
Egyptian married women to increase the time they spend in the labor market. Hus-
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bands are assumed to not participate at all in domestic activities; which is quite
close to the reality. and For that, the implementation of more serious family policies
calling for a more equitable division of labor within the family are strongly needed
to allow to married women, and specifically the more educated ones, to increase
their market’s labor supply. Also, part time jobs taking full account of the burden
of females’ household responsibilities are crucial to enforce females insertion in the
labor market.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 exibits some stylized facts on females
time allocation and marriage in Egypt. Section 2 is devoted to the presentation of
the dataset used as well as the methodology adopted. Section 4 shows the empirical
results. And, Section 6 goes on to conclude.
2 New Conceptualizations and Females’ Time Al-
location
In Egypt, as in most of developing as well as developed countries, researchers and
policy makers call governments to give a considerable attention to the interaction
between work and the family in order to increase females’ participation rates. There
is an extensive literature on the “dilemmas” of modern family life (Frinking and
Willemsem, 1997; Gerson, 1985). It has to be recognized that the division of paid
(market) and unpaid (domestic) work does not only concern the family unit but
also the whole society since it has many socioeconomic implications. It also seems
that even though women’s level of education has considerably increased differences
in paid work- though narrowing- are still largely persisting. Regarding the quasi
absence of time allocation literature in Egypt (and in the Arab world), the present
work aims at studying the allocation of time between market and domestic work to
allow for a better measurement and consideration of female’s work. This needs to
be extended, in future works, to the study of the allocation of time of both sexes in
order to allow for a better understanding of modern households and consequently, to
implement active family policies. But for this, researchers need more detailed time
use data on both sexes in Egypt and in the MENA region general.
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Despite all the changes that have occurred in the cultural and economic contexts in
Egypt, domestic production continues to be considered as a typically female chore.
Studying domestic production is then crucial to illustrate the economic contribution
of housewives to the financial affaires of a household and to society at large. Note
that the abuse of the “housewife” concept in collecting data has been a major source
of underreporting and misunderstanding of female’s gainful employment (Ibrahim,
1983).
Several questions arise: Did the increase in the females’ participation rates during the
last decade imply a substitution of work at home by work in the market. How did the
domestic production change over time (especially with the decrease in fertility and
increase of time saving devices). How does marriage affects time uses of Egyptian
females. Note that the present study remains descriptive and particularly aims at
having a glance on how Egyptian females used their time, the evolution of time
allocation patterns, and the difference between single and married time uses.
As showed in previous empirical studies in Egypt, at different points of time 1988,
1998 and 2006, over 65 percent of ever married females are not actively engaged in
market production and during any given year not more than 30 percent participate
in the labor market (Assaad, 2007; Assaad and El-Hamidi, 2009). In other words,
the wife’s sole occupation in Egypt remains housewife. The main serious limitation
is that in Egypt, detailed time use data are only available for females. Males are
thus assumed to not contribute at all to domestic production. Their time use is
then entirely devoted to market work and leisure. A more complete time use survey
on both sexes is crucial for more complete studies on time allocation. Although, it
remains useful to examine the factors that determine the females time allocation.
The first part of this section is dedicated to the presentation of the data we data. In
a second stage, we conduct a cross-sectional analysis aiming at exploring Egyptian
females time uses by different work categories in 2006. Then, using both surveys
of 1998 and 2006, we make use of the panel aspect of the data in order to observe
differences in females time uses that result from changes in the marital status. In
the bellow analysis, we distinguish between three main work categories. (1) Market
work encompasses all activities that produce goods and services that contribute
to national wealth and economic growth (Donahoe, 1999). The latter includes all
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market and subsistence activities whether these activities are paid in monetary, in
kind or unpaid work for family. (2) Domestic work involves all unpaid work done
to maintain family members and/or a home. It includes housework and child care
activities. And finally, (3) total work regroups that last two categories to account
for the total time spent per week in all work categories. Typically, subtracting this
latter from the total weekly time available for individuals- 24 hours multiplied by 7
days equals 168 hours per week- would allow the calculation of the weekly time of
leisure.
3 Data
We are fortunate to have both the Egyptian Labor Market Survey 1998 and the
Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey 2006 that include a whole section on females
and children time spent not only in market and subsistence work but data is also
available for the domestic activities. In a first part of the study- the cross sectional
analysis- our sample contains all women aged between 16 and 64; which represents a
total of 5 767 women from the 2006 survey. Moreover, a sample for single and married
males is created due to the same sample selection. Those constitute a random sample
of the population. In the ELMPS of 2006, a whole section is devoted to time use
of Egyptian women. We base our analysis on a specific question: how did you
spend the preceding week. The domestic activities were classified into 14 groups.
However, for the 1998’s survey, only three aggregated questions are available. For
this reason, we conduct the cross sectional analysis only on the 2006’s survey since we
are convinced that the latter is able to reflect the real time females spend in domestic
activities. Data also have background information for each respondent including age,
education, occupation, work status, spouse’s education, individual earnings, family
income, family’s welfare, and a lot of information regarding parents’ background,
fertility, marriage costs etc...
In the bellow analysis, I also explore the panel aspect of the data by making use
of both surveys. The idea is to consider all females who were single in 1998 and
to follow their marital status till 2006. Some of the latter got married between the
two dates and others remain single and did not change their marital status. In the
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longitudinal analysis, we have a sample of 1 850 females.
4 Descriptive Analysis
4.1 A Cross-sectional Analysis
As it is showed in the table 1, actually married females with children spend,
in mean, 51.72 hours per week on domestic chores. And, assuming that males do
not participate at all in domestic activities, these women’s weekly time spent on
total work (hours spent on both market and domestic production) is 60.98; that
exceeds the declared time that married males spend in market work. However, time
use data on both sexes would allow a more precise comparison between men and
women’s time allocation. table 1 also display mean hours of single females as well
as married females without children by work activity. Despite the similar number of
hours women of these two categories spend in market work, married women without
children spend about 10 hours more in housework activities compared to their singles
counterparts. Clearly, marriage, as expected, seems to significantly increase one
female’s family burden and reduces her leisure time; which consequently affects her
participation and labour supply decisions.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 2 displays sample means by marital status, work category and age group.
As expected, for single and married women, those aged between 36 and 45 years
old are those who spend the higher number of mean hours in market activities.
Interestingly, single and married females of all age groups spend similar number of
hours in market work. However, married females tend to spend longer hours in
domestic activities than their singles counterparts. For instance, for the 16-35 age
group, married and single females spend in mean 32.05 and 18.91 hours respectively
in domestic activities. This leads to a significant difference between time spent by
these women in total work which consequently affect their leisure time and creates
what social scientists call “the double burden problem”. Similarly, married females
aged between 46 and 64 years old spend 40.91 hours in mean in total work relative
to only 31.75 hours for their singles counterparts. To put into a nutshell, married
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females in general do not work less in the market but do work much more at home
than singles. And, this should be considered by policy markers by creating more
jobs that allow the reconciliation between private and professional lives.
[Table 2 about here]
Turning our analysis to the impact of the presence of children in the household on
married females’ time uses taking into full consideration different age groups. For
the 36-45 age group, as showed in table 3, we observe that married females without
children spend in mean 5 hours more in market activities relatively to those married
with children. On the other hand, having children imply a significant increase the
time spent on child care activities. Consequently, married females with children
spend about 15 hours more than singles on domestic activities. Then, in total, having
children largely influences the total work; 60.85 hours for those having children and
50.59 hours for females without children. For instance, for all age groups, females
with children spend a significantly larger number of hours in total work. In table 3
we observe that females with children work in total double the time females without
children do. For females aged between 16 and 35, 62.30 and 37.54 mean hours are
spent in total work respectively for females with children and those without. This
is also verified for the other aged groups. In conclusion, as well as marriage, fertility
is an important factor affecting women’s both market and domestic labor supplies.
[Table 3 about here]
Table 4 represents the mean hours spent by married females in work category by
number of children. It distinguishes between three types of married females: those
not having children, those having only one child and females having two or more
children. We observe that the first child is the one who matters the most in terms
of changing time use patterns. For instance, females having one, two and more
children have similar time use features. However, when married females having no
children are compared to those having one child, we find out that the latest group of
women spend in mean only one hour less in market work and about 20 hours more
in domestic work. This is mainly due to the significant increase in time spent in
child care activities when having a first child.
9
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[Table 4 about here]
Turning our analysis to working females, we observe, as shown in table 5, that
regardless the marital status women spend as expected, a larger weekly number of
hours in the private sector relatively to both the public sector and the independent
work. Note that the private sector encompasses both formal and informal jobs. For
this reason, the private sector mainly employs single females; 70.34 percent of all
females working in the private sector are singles. Clearly, this demonstrates the
inefficiency of this sector to account for the family/ professional reconciliation issue;
which forces women to drop out the labor force when they marry and have children.
For this, married females with children are largely concentrated in the public sector
due to greater prevalence of family-friendly policies- as maternity leave, flexible
hours, and work from home jobs- in this sector (Sieverding, 2010). In effect, as
we observe in table 5, 59.68 percent of all females working in the public sector are
married females with children. The latter observation shows to what extent these
family-friendly policies are crucial in order to encourage women to keep their jobs
after marriage. Similarly, the independent sector seems to be dominated by married
females for the same reasons. In effect, as it will be shown in the empirical results
section, having a family projet positively and significantly increases one females’
market labor supply.
[Table 5 about here]
Table 6 displays sample means of married females by levels of education. Inter-
estingly, we observe that all married females spend the same number of hours, in
mean, in housework activities no matter their level of education. However, more
educated females spend longer hours taking care of their children. Consequently,
married females with higher levels of education, contrarily to what expected, spend
longer hours in domestic activities as a whole. Illiterate females, females having a
less than intermediate education, females with intermediate education and females
with above than intermediate education spend in mean 42.97, 48.23, 51.06 and 48.01
weekly hours respectively in domestic activities. In addition to this, females having
intermediate education and above have higher market labour supplies than females
with less than intermediate education. Consequently, as shown in the last line of
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table 6, the more married females are educated and the more they spend time in
total work.
[Table 6 about here]
In contrast, as presented in table 7, single females with high levels of education
spend between 5 and 10 weekly hours less in domestic work relatively to illiterate
single females. And, females having an above intermediate education have higher
market labor supplies compared to less educated ones. Surprisingly, the total work
of illiterate single females is significantly higher relatively to females with less than
intermediate educated and females with intermediate education; 34.79, 20.04, and
29.07 mean hours respectively. Nevertheless, the most educated single females- hav-
ing an above intermediate education- spend about 41 hours per week in all work
categories; which represent the highest labor supply.
[Table 7 about here]
Similar results are presented in figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Note that, in the figures
bellow, we distinguish between general and technical education; which seems to have
important implication on our analysis. In conclusion, Contrarily to Singles, married
women tend to spend much more time in domestic activities and fewer hours in
market activities.
[Figure 1 about here]
This result is verified for females of all levels of education except for illiterate and
general intermediate education. As shown in figure 2, married illiterate females spend
longer hours in both domestic and market work. And, this is also the case of married
females having a general education who, contrarily to technical educated ones, spend
a larger number of hours in all work category than their singles counterparts.
[Figures 2 and 3 about here]
4.2 A Longitudinal Analysis
The aim of this section is to understand how do females’ time allocation change
as they transition into marriage. To address this question, I rely on the panel aspect
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of the ELMS and ELMPS data. And, to observe how a change in females marital
status would affect their time allocations between different working categories, I
restrict the sample to single females aged from 13 to 35 years old in 1998, which
yields to a final sample of 1 144 females. Note that I restricted the sample to females
aged from 16 to 35 in 1998 as 16 is the legal age of marriage.
In the present longitudinal descriptive analysis, I compare time use of females who
remained single during the whole 8 years period to those who got married between
1998 and 2006.
Table 11 represents means and standard deviations- by females marital status in
2006- with respect to demographic and socioeconomic variables such as the highest
educational attainment, region of residence, age, Parental household wealth in 1998,
parental education levels, number of children if married, access to basic services
in 2006 -as water, electricity etc..- as well as other variables reflecting the working
status, market labour supply and domestic labour supply in 1998 and in 2006.
[Table 11 about here]
Turning our analysis to the evolution of females time allocation from 1998 to 2006, we
observe in figure 7 that- by age category in 2006, only for females who remained single
in both dates- both domestic and market labour supplies do not change significantly
between the two dates. Only for single females aged between 36 and 45 years old in
2006, their market labor supply increases from 30 weekly hours in 1998 to reach 48
weekly hours in 2006. This could be due to the fact that these women are discouraged
and decided to stop the spouse’s search at the age of 40 and are, in 2006, devoting
all their time to market work.
[Figure 7 about here]
In contrast, time uses of females who transited into marriage have significantly
changed between 1998 and 2006. In figure 8, we observe that the transition into
marriage increases dramatically the time spent in domestic activities. This result is
valid for all age groups. If we turn our analysis to the females aged from 26 to 39 in
2006 (and from 18 to 31 in 1998), we find out that their domestic labor supply rose
from 22 to 53 mean hours in 1998 and 2006 respectively; as a result of transition
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into marriage. Despite this large change in domestic labour supply, market labour
supply after marriage tend to be quite similar to that before marriage.
[Figure 8 about here]
In addition to this, table 12 displays the transitions from/into market activities by
females marital status in 2006. Clearly, a large part of females who were active in
1998 continue to participate in market work in 2006 conditional on remaining single;
75 percent of singles to participate in the labour market. Contrarily, when they
transit into marriage, about 60 percent of females dropped out the labor force. In
other words, marriage seems to increase the probability of exiting the labour force.
[Table 12 about here]
Similarly, when looking at the impact of transition into marriage on participation in
domestic work, we observe that whether the woman participated or not in domestic
activities in 1998, marriage results in the transition of 100 percent of those women
into domestic work.
[Table 13 about here]
Both cross-sectional and longitudinal analysis presented above illustrated that fe-
males who transited into marriage are less likely to pursue their market work and
more likely to be involved in domestic work than their unmarried peers.
5 Methodology: Propensity Score Estimator
The main objective of the present section is to estimate the effect of the treatment-
the transition into marriage- on both market and domestic females labour supplies.
To do this, I opt for a matching estimation in order to establish a causal relationship
between females marital status and domestic versus market participation. In other
words, we are interested measuring the response to the treatment “getting married”
to a benchmark “remaining single”.
In observational studies, by definition there are no experimental controls. therefore,
there is no direct counterpart of the Average Treatment Effect ATE calculated as
13
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a mean difference between the outcomes of the treated and nontreated groups. In
other words, the counterfactual is not identified. As a substitute we may obtain
data from a set of potential comparison units that are not necessarily drawn from
the same population as the treated units, but for whom the observable characteris-
tics, x, match those of the treated units up to some selected degree of closeness.
The method of propensity score (Rosenbaun and Rubin, 1983) is a popular inexact
matching method. Rather that match on the regressors it matches on the propensity
score. Even here an exact match is not possible, so the comparison units are those
whose propensity scores are sufficiently close to the treated unit. The propensity
score, the conditional probability of receiving treatment given x, denoted p(x), was
suggested by (Rosenbaun and Rubin, 1983) as a matching measure. The idea here
is that, if the data justify matching on x, then matching based on propensity score
is justified. A propensity score is usually estimated using a parametric model such
as a logit or probit. For implementation of the PSM, one controls for the covariates
by controlling for a particular function of the covariates, specifically the conditional
probability of treatment, Pr[Di = 1 | xi]. That is, matching is on the propensity
score. This can be easily calculated by (for example) a logit regression. Moreover,
one can also control for lagged variables by including them in the vector of covari-
ates. If selection bias is eliminated by controlling for xi, it is is also eliminated by
controlling for the propensity score. Conditioning on the propensity score is often
simpler than conditioning on a large dimension vector x.
When treatment is not by random assignment but depends stochastically on a vec-
tor of observable variables x, as in observational data , or when the treatment is
targeted to some population defined by some observable characteristics (such as age,
sex, or socioeconomic status), then the concept of propensity scores is useful. This is
a conditional probability measure of treatment participation given x and is denoted
p(x) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), where
p(x) = Pr[D = 1|X = x], (1)
The propensity score measure can be computed given the data Di = xi) by going a
logit regression. An assumption that plays an important role in treatment evaluation
14
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is the balancing condition, which states that
D ⊥ x | p(x), (2)
This can be expressed alternatively by saying that for individuals with the same
propensity score the assignment to treatment is random and should look identical
in terms of x vector.
A useful result about conditional independence given p(x) due to Rosenbaum and
Rubin (1983) states that
y0, y1 ⊥ D | x⇒ y0, y1 ⊥ D | p(x), (3)
This implies that the conditional independence assumption x implies conditional
independence given p(x), that is, independence of y0, y1, andD given p(x). To obtain
this result, note that
Pr[D = 1 | y0, y1, p(x) = E[D | y0, y1, p(x)] (4)
= E[E[D | y0, y1, p(x), x] | y0, y1, p(x)]
= E[E[D | y0, y1, x] | y0, y1, p(x)]
= E[E[D | x] | y0, y1, p(x)]
= E[p(x) | y0, y1, p(x)]
= p(x),
Here the second and third lines follow from the law of iterated expectations. The
fourth line uses conditional independence. The intuition behind is that p(x) is a
particular function of x and; in a sense, contains less information than x.
Using a sample of 1 144 women, I estimate the average treatment effect on the time
spent in domestic activities as well as its effect on market labour supply. Results of
the latter estimates are presented in the following section.
15
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.34
6 Empirical Results
Table 14 displays the results of the determinants of the treatment. Basic de-
mographic and socioeconomic characteristics are used as covariates. Clearly, the
probability of being treated increase with the level of education. In other words,
females having a less than intermediate level od education as well as those having a
general intermediate level of education are fortunate to have higher probabilities of
getting married between 1998 and 2006 relative to their illiterate peers. Turning the
analysis to regions, we can observe that- with Cairo and Alexandria as reference-
living in rural areas increases significantly the probability of being treated. I also
controlled for other covariates as whether the female was working in 1998 as well
as for the parental household wealth in 1998. But the latter do not seem to have
significant effects the treatment.
[Table 14 about here]
Table 15 shows matching estimates. When looking at the ATE lines, we observe that,
not surprisingly, treated females spend- in mean- about 30 hours more on domestic
work and 8 hours less on market work compared to their untreated peers. The latter
results seems confirm our hypothesis that marriage alone explains an important part
of the low females participation in Egypt. Again, Egyptian married females need
more equitable allocation of domestic activities within their own households as well
as more efficient family-friendly policies in the labor market.
[Table 15 about here]
7 Research’s Contribution and Policy Implication
We have plenty of information and studies about the time that females spend in
the market but none on the submerged part spent at home. Economists have made a
large effort to explain the market behavior of married women, that is, their pattern of
participation, the number of hours worked, the determinants of wives earnings, their
occupational choice, and the male- female wage differential. However, the present
research is the first to analyze the allocation of time within the home sector, an
16
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.34
allocation which may have an impact on the well- being of the family that is not less
important than the change in the woman’s working habits. Actually, it seems quite
difficult to detect the influence of policy measures on the actual individual behavior,
especially with regard to work, child care and housekeeping. It is necessary though
to calculate how much time is spent on each of the above activities. No money is
involved in work like cooking, taking care of the children or house cleaning, though
much time is needed for this kind of work. If women have to pay for the value of
domestic work for reconciling family and working life, the risk for them to leave
their labor market position as well as their independent incomes becomes higher.
Thus, Egypt, as most of developing and developed countries, needs for many reg-
ulation reforms to reduce the persistent gender biased intra household division of
labor. For this, policies that support women’s access to productive employment,
with equal wages for equal jobs, taking full account of the burden of women’s family
and household responsibilities are strongly needed to be considered. An example of
such kind of jobs could be part time jobs. Hence, we expect the results of this study
to be of great importance to policymakers and Non Governmental Organizations;
especially when designing family policies. More specifically, effective state policies
are needed to actively support the role of the family, i.e. of women, to substitute the
lacking welfare state to affect towards the division of paid and unpaid work. Then,
policies affecting not only women’s participation in the labor force but also people’s
attitudes towards the division of paid and unpaid work are needed. And, it seems
that the existing policies in Egypt are not sufficient in the respect. The aim of this
project is then, first, to explore this new area of research in Egypt in order to gain
insight into policy measures that are effective in influencing women’s time allocation.
Our target is thus to propose, relying on empirical results, more effective policies in
Egypt that would allow not only the increase of women’s participation to paid work
but also a more equitable division of labor within families: Flexible employment
facilities the reconciliation of work and family life. Best practice arrangements could
be: employee sovereignty over working times, equal access to productive employment
with equal wages for equal jobs (for men and women), promotion and benefits, the
reconciliation of paid work and family life. It is surely important to find appropriate
forms of intervention for supporting the family, which should combine financial sup-
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port for beneficiaries, without undermining the structure of family life. Organized
voluntarism could also play an important role, while the informal networks, which
have traditionally sustained the family, should be reinforced.
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Definitions
The Market Definition of Labor Force “includes All females engaged in
economic activities for purposes of market exchange.” (Assaad and El-Hamidi, 2009).
The Extended Definition of Labor Force “ includes those engaged in the
production and processing of primary products, whether for the market, for barter,
or for their own consumption; the production of all other goods and services for the
market; and, in the case of households that produce such goods and services for
the market, the corresponding production for their own consumption. The extended
definition includes many women engaged in animal husbandry and the processing
of dairy of products for purposes of household consumption, in addition to those
engaged in market activity.” (Assaad and El-Hamidi, 2009).
Domestic Activities is identified as the unpaid work done to maintain family
members and/or a home. In the present study, we distinguish between two categories
of domestic work. The first category is “housework” and the second is “‘child care”.
In our data, “housework” includes agriculture activities, raising poultry, producing
butter/ cheese, cooking, washing dishes, doing laundry, cleaning house, collecting
water, collecting firewood, helping in construction work, caring for the sick/ the
elderly and shopping for the household. And, regarding “Child care”, it represents
the time spent taking care of children.
The Extra-Extended Definition of Labor Force includes those considered
as working due to the market definition, the extended definition, or engaged in do-
mestic activities.
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Tables and Figures
Tables
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1: Sample means by marital status, work category and presence of children in
the household*
Singles Married Married All
without children with children
Time use *
Market Work 8.87 7.56 9.26 8.83
Domestic Work 20.84 32.58 51.72 37.53
Housework 19.97 31.74 38.86 30.97
Child Care 0.87 0.84 12.86 6.56
Total Work 29.71 40.14 60.98 46.36
N 4103 2000 5526 11629
Notes: i. * This table shows females time uses using weekly hours of work. ii. Child care represents the time
spent taking care of children. iii. Total work represents the sum of all time spent on work in the market
and work at home.
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
Table 2: Sample means by marital status, work category and age group
Singles Married
16-35 36-45 46-64 16-35 36-45 46-64
Time Use
Market Work 7.89 19.26 8.81 5.49 18.31 8.05
Domestic Work 18.91 34.49 22.94 32.05 32.28 32.86
Housework 18.28 31.35 21.99 31.92 32.03 31.64
Child Care 0.63 3.14 0.95 0.12 0.25 1.22
Total work 26.80 53.75 31.75 37.54 50.59 40.91
N 2954 284 865 640 65 1295
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
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Table 3: Sample means of married females by presence of children, work category
and Age Group
16-35 36-45 46-64
Married No children
Market Work 5.49 18.31 8.05
Domestic Work 32.05 32.28 32.86
Housework 31.92 32.03 31.64
Child Care 0.12 0.25 1.22
Total Work 37.54 50.59 40.91
Observations 640 65 1295
Married With Children
Market Work 6.46 13.83 13.11
Domestic Work 55.84 47.02 39.42
Housework 38.98 39.24 36.80
Child Care 16.86 7.77 2.62
Total Work 62.30 60.85 52.53
N 3379 1645 502
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
Table 4: Time uses of Egyptian married females: Sample Means by number of
children
Number of children
Zero One > 2 Total
Time Uses
Market work 7.61 6.43 10.08 8.83
Domestic work 32.74 53.91 51.15 46.72
Housework 31.9 36.23 39.65 37.04
Child care 0.84 17.68 11.49 9.68
Total work 40.35 60.34 61.23 55.5
N 1989 1229 4293 7511
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
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Table 5: Sample means by marital status, presence of children and working sector
(only for working females)
Singles Married Married All
without Children with Children
Public 41.11 41.41 40.55 37.72
(23.3%) (17.03%) (59.68%) (100%)
Government 40.93 41.16 40.42
Public entrep. 42.84 44.92 43.25
Private 54.27 47.12 43.2 51.70
(70.34%) (6.3%) (23.36%) (100%)
Formal 51.09 45.15 44.7
Informal 55.93 49.45 45.84
Independ. 36.99 31.43 32.89 33.75
(27.23%) (17.58%) (55.18%) (100%)
N 830 409 1369 2608
(31.83%) (15.68%) (52.49%) (100%)
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
Table 6: Sample means of Egyptian married females by level of education
Level of education
Illiterate Less than Interm. Above Total
interm. interm.
Age 40.17 34.78 31.36 33.99 36
Time Uses
Market work 6.68 3.14 9.79 17.66 8.83
Domestic work 42.97 48.23 51.06 48.01 46.72
Housework 36.42 38.51 37.87 36.08 37.04
Child care 6.55 9.72 13.18 11.94 9.68
Total work 49.65 51.37 60.85 65.67 55.5
N 3241 955 2146 1167 7511
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
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Table 7: Time Uses of Egyptian Single Females: Sample Means by Level of Education
Level of education
Illiterate Less than Interm. Above Total
interm. interm.
Age 42.73 22.45 23.05 28.02 29.41
Time Uses
Market work 8.73 3.77 9.02 19.66 8.97
Domestic work 26.06 16.27 20.05 21.35 21.05
Housework 24.76 15.70 19.20 20.73 20.17
Child care 1.29 0.56 0.85 0.62 0.88
Total work 34.79 20.04 29.07 41.01 30.02
Observations 1211 1026 1296 522 4056
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
Table 8: Sample means of single females by work category and working sector
Public Private Independent Housewives All
Time Use
Market work 41.11 54.27 36.99 0.00
(31.33%) (32.29%) ( 36.39%) (0%) 100%
Domestic work 25.61 14.62 31.77 20.21
Housework 24.39 14.36 30.04 19.39
Child care 1.22 0.26 1.73 0.83
Total work 66.72 68.89 68.76 20.21
N 260 268 302 3226 2608
(6.40%) (6.61%) (7.45%) (79.54%) (100%)
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
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Table 9: sample means of married females without children by work category and
working sector
Public Private Independent Housewives All
Time Use
Market work 41.42 47.12 31.43 0.00
(46.45%) ( 5.87%) (47.68%) (0%) (100%)
Domestic work 32.3 32.08 42.22 31.64
Housework 31.7 31.04 41.16 30.8
Child care 0.6 1.04 1.06 0.84
Total work 73.72 79.2 73.65 31.64
N 190 24 195 1580 1989
(9.55%) (1.21%) (9.80%) (79.44%) (100%)
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
Table 10: Sample means of married females With children by work category and
working sector
Public Private Independent Housewives Total
Time Use
Market work 40.55 45.2 32.89 0.00
(48.65%) (6.50%) (44.70%) (0%) (100%)
Domestic work 46.03 45.62 54.5 52.39
Housework 36.09 32.49 46.99 38.26
Child care 9.94 13.12 7.51 14.13
Total work 86.58 90.82 87.39 52.39
N 666 89 612 4153 5522
(12.06%) (1.61%) (11.08%) (75.25%) (100%)
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 2006.
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Table 11: Variables Mean and Standard Deviation by Marital Status in 2006
Singles Married All
Variable N Mean Sd. Dev. N Mean Sd. Dev. N Mean Sd. Dev.
age 1998 469 20,49 4,78 675 19,99 3,43 1144 20,19 4,04
age 2006 469 27,55 4,90 675 27,09 3,52 1144 27,28 4,15
Age Marriage - - - 675 23,49 3,64 675 23,49 3,64
Market hrs. 1998 54 11,72 7,95 110 10,74 6,58 164 11,06 7,05
Market hrs. 2006 166 45,60 12,50 121 41,04 10,78 287 43,68 12,00
Domestic hrs. 1998 469 18,79 17,65 675 23,48 16,97 1144 21,56 17,40
Domestic hrs 2006 469 21,65 17,80 675 52,22 31,60 1144 39,69 30,74
Father Educ 2006 160 3,06 2,31 664 2,90 2,23 824 2,93 2,25
Mother Educ 2006 59 1,53 1,29 655 1,98 1,80 714 1,94 1,77
Nbr. Children 2006 - - - 675 1,35 0,86 675 1,35 0,86
Nbr. Children 1998 - - - - - - - - -
Working in 2006 469 0,35 0,48 675 0,17 0,38 1144 0,25 0,43
Working in 1998 469 0,17 0,37 675 0,15 0,35 1144 0,15 0,36
low Wealth 1998 469 0,84 0,36 675 0,86 0,34 1144 0,85 0,35
high Wealth 1998 469 0,16 0,36 675 0,14 0,34 1144 0,15 0,35
Educ1 2006 469 0,08 0,27 675 0,09 0,29 1144 0,09 0,28
Educ2 2006 469 0,12 0,32 675 0,13 0,34 1144 0,13 0,33
Educ3 2006 469 0,01 0,09 675 0,01 0,12 1144 0,01 0,11
Educ4 2006 469 0,30 0,46 675 0,39 0,49 1144 0,35 0,48
Educ5 2006 469 0,07 0,25 675 0,06 0,24 1144 0,06 0,25
Educ6 2006 469 0,36 0,48 675 0,29 0,45 1144 0,32 0,47
HH size 2006 469 5,30 2,18 675 3,55 1,37 1144 4,27 1,95
HH size1998 469 6,36 2,69 675 6,56 2,82 1144 6,48 2,77
Cairo 2006 469 0,21 0,41 675 0,15 0,36 1144 0,17 0,38
Alex. 2006 469 0,16 0,36 675 0,15 0,36 1144 0,15 0,36
Region1 2006 469 0,19 0,39 675 0,15 0,35 1144 0,16 0,37
Region2 2006 469 0,20 0,40 675 0,19 0,39 1144 0,19 0,39
Region3 2006 469 0,13 0,33 675 0,22 0,42 1144 0,18 0,39
Region4 2006 469 0,12 0,32 675 0,15 0,35 1144 0,13 0,34
Basic services 2006 469 3,12 1,25 675 3 1 1144 2,86 1,17
Notes: i. Region1 represents Urban lower Egypt, Region2 represents Urban Upper Egypt, Region3 represents Rural lower Egypt, and
Region4 represents Rural Upper Egypt. ii. Educ1 is “Illiterate”, Educ2 is “less than intermediate” education, Educ3 is the “general
intermediate” education, Educ4 id the “technical intermediate”, Educ5 is the “above intermediate”, and Educ6 is the “university” level of
education.
Source: constructed by the author using the ELMS of 1998 and the ELMPS of 2006
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Table 12: Transitions from/into Market Work by marital status in 2006
Singles Married
Market work 2006 Market work 2006
Market work 1998 No Yes Total No Yes Total
No 285 106 391 500 76 576
72,89 27,11 100 86,81 13,19 100
93,75 64,24 83,37 89,45 65,52 85,33
Yes 19 59 78 59 40 99
24,36 75,64 100 59,6 40,4 100
6,25 35,76 16,63 10,55 34,48 14,67
Total 304 165 469 559 116 675
64,82 35,18 100 82,81 17,19 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: All females are single in 1998.
Source: Constructed by the author using the panel sample 1998-2006.
Table 13: Transitions from/into Domestic Work by marital status in 2006
Singles Married
Domestic work 2006 Domestic work 2006
Domestic work 1998 No Yes Total No Yes Total
No 21 133 154 0 142 142
13,64 86,36 100 - 100 100
43,75 31,59 32,84 - 21,04 21,04
Yes 27 288 315 0 533 533
8,57 91,43 100 - 100 100
56,25 68,41 67,16 - 78,96 78,96
Total 48 421 469 0 675 675
10,23 89,77 100 - 100 100
100 100 100 - 100 100
Note: All females are single in 1998.
Source: Constructed by the author using the panel sample 1998-2006.
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Empirical Results
Table 14: Probability of the Treatment
Treated Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval]
age 2006 0.657*** 0.102 6.420 0.000 0.457 0.858
age square 2006 -0.011*** 0.002 -6.530 0.000 -0.014 -0.008
Educ2 2006 0.283* 0.157 1.800 0.072 -0.025 0.592
Educ3 2006 0.608 0.375 1.620 0.106 -0.128 1.343
Educ4 2006 0.366*** 0.132 2.780 0.005 0.108 0.624
Educ5 2006 0.203 0.192 1.060 0.290 -0.173 0.579
Educ6 2006 0.141 0.143 0.990 0.323 -0.139 0.421
Region2 -0.096 0.117 -0.820 0.410 -0.326 0.133
Region3 0.038 0.111 0.340 0.735 -0.179 0.254
Region3 0.377*** 0.123 3.060 0.002 0.135 0.618
Region4 0.249* 0.139 1.790 0.074 -0.024 0.522
Working 1998 -0.038 0.118 -0.320 0.748 -0.269 0.193
wealth 1998 -0.075 0.053 -1.430 0.153 -0.179 0.028
Constant -9.536*** 1.511 -6.310 0.000 -12.498 -6.574
Pseudo R2 0.055
Log likelihood -728.841
Prob > chi2 0.000
N 1140.000
Note: i. Dependent Variable is a binary variable that is equal to one if the female got married between 1998
and 2006 and, equals to zero if the female remained single at least till 2006. ii. *** statistically significant
at the 1% level, ** statistically significant at the 5% level, * statistically significant at the 10% level.
Table 15: Matching Estimates
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
Domestic Hrs 2006 Unmatched 52.231 21.672 30.560 1.618 18.880
ATT 52.269 21.542 30.727 1.823 16.850
ATU 21.718 49.884 28.166
ATE 29.678
Market Hrs 2006 Unmatched 7.368 16.208 -8.840 1.170 -7.550
ATT 7.340 16.539 -9.199 1.868 -4.930
ATU 16.088 9.817 -6.271
ATE -7.999
Notes: i. ATT: Average treatment effect on the treated. ii. ATU: Average treatment effect on the untreated.
iii. ATE: Average treatment effects.
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Table 16: Treatment assignment
Common support
Treatment assignment Off support On support Total
Untreated 1 465 466
Treated 4 670 674
Total 5 1,135 1,140
Notes: i. The overlap condition for persons with the same x value in X are allowed
to have a positive probability of being in treated and control groups.
Table 17: Determinants of domestic Labor supply
Singles (16-64) Married (16-64) All
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
age 2006 2,617*** 1,412*** 4,049***
age square 2006 -0,034*** -0,023*** -0,047***
Age at marriage - 0,212** -
HH whealth in 1998 -1,360*** 0,891** -1,009***
Basic Services in 2006 -0,641 -0,753* -1,622***
Educ dummy2 14,185*** 1,349 7,925***
Educ dummy3 3,723 -0,802 10,953***
Educ dummy4 8,473*** 1,865 12,243***
Educ dummy5 9,460*** 2,141 12,764***
Educ dummy6 6,654*** -1,913 9,463***
Number of Children in HH 1,454* 4,890*** 6,138***
Parent in the HH - -30,323*** -24,164***
Sister/Bro. in law - - -26,280***
Mother in law - -15,750 -39,366***
Dummy for Family Projet 1,021 -1,559 -0,891
Region dummy 2 0,667 -7,404*** -4,042***
Region dummy 3 -0,551 -4,176*** -1,887***
Constant -22,570*** 22,121*** -41,202***
Sigma 19,494 27,028 25,718
Log Likelihood -6868,7003 -18045,825 -33284,573
Pseudo R squared 0,0188 0,0109 0,0626
N 1835 3851 8554
Notes: i. Tobit Results. ii. Dependent Variable: weekly hours spent on Domestic Work.
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Table 18: Determinants of Market labor supply
Singles (16-64) Married (16-64) All
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
age -0,350 0,429 0,103
age square 0,003 -0,006* -0,002
Age at marriage - 0,097 -
HH whealth in 1998 -0,212 -1,159*** 0,368***
Basic Services in 2006 -0,510 -0,120 -0,026
Educ dummy2 -1,542 -0,387 -0,016
Educ dummy3 20,031 -3,974 3,616
Educ dummy4 1,412 -1,896 -2,061
Educ dummy5 -1,482 -2,592 -3,407***
Educ dummy6 -8,518** -1,659 -4,390***
Number of Children in HH 2,459 -0,517 -1,053***
Parent in the HH (dummy) - -14,810 -0,362
Sister/Bro. in law - - -6,277
Presence of a Mother in law - - -20,724
Dummy for Family Projet 0,637 1,305* 1,855***
Region dummy 2 -3,816** -2,988*** -3,678***
Region dummy 3 -8,665*** -4,823*** -6,308***
Constant 67,175*** 61,426*** 62,445***
Sigma 13,104 11,787 12,939
Log Likelihood -1244,3003 -3681,4066 -5886,6716
Pseudo R squared 0,0418 0,0253 0,0267
N 313 948 1480
Notes: i. Tobit Results. ii. Dependent Variable: weekly hours spent on Market Work.
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Figures
Figure 1: Time allocation by marital status
 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
Figure 2: Time allocation by marital status: for illiterate
 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
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Figure 3: Time allocation by marital status: for general intermediate
 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
Figure 4: Time allocation by marital status: for technical intermediate
 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
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Figure 5: Time allocation by marital status: for above intermediate
 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
Figure 6: Time allocation by marital status: for university
 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS 2006.
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Figure 7: Evolution of time allocation by age group 1998-2006: Singles
 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 1998 and 2006.
Figure 8: Evolution of time allocation by age group 1998-2006: Married
 
Source: Constructed by the author using the ELMPS of 1998 and 2006.
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